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BOOK REVIEWS
Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court. By Wallace
Mendelson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Pp.
xi, 151. $4.00.
This is an interesting book about two complex, stubborn Justices
who have made their marks on the American scene. The author
compares, contrasts, and analyzes; and the result is insight not only
into the minds and philosophies of the two, but also into the problems and role of the Supreme Court over the past three decades.
Professor Mendelson finds that both of the Justices are "liberals"
but that they differ greatly in two respects: (1) their approach to
legal problems; and (2) their conception of the role of the Supreme
Court. He also finds that one has greater faith in man's ability to
find his own way toward justice and the good life, and that the other
has greater faith in the prospects for achieving justice and truth.
Justice Frankfurter is categorized under the heading of "humilitarian." He believes in the possible as the objective, and that such
words as relative and balancing are vital ones for the Court. He
believes that authority and faith (placed in state courts, for example)
encourage responsibility; that law is not perfect and cannot be made
perfect. He seeks to restrain judicial legislation and to avoid concentration of power in the courts. Other humilitarians, according
to the author, were Taney, Waite, Holmes, Brandeis, Learned Hand,
Stone and Cardozo. Of Frankfurter he writes:
Deeply libertarian in private thought and action, he sees what
partisans do not see: that if effective transcendental arguments may be made for the social priority of personal liberty,
no less powerful considerations in the abstract would sustain
the primacy of economic interests.1
From a personal bedrock of democratic idealism, then, Frankfurter
as a judge comprehends the importance of balance between interests
(including property interests) and the importance of judicial restraint. He views the over-all and the future.
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[S]ince the Supreme Court cannot review more than a drop
in the flood of American litigation . . .that drop must be
selected, not on the basis of Justice to any litigant, but in the
interest of balance among the various elements in the governmental structure.2
And the Justice does not believe that the Court should impose its own
standard on the community.
With Frankfurter in a grouping which contains a fair share of
the popular heroes of the Court, one is anxious to see the company
in which the author places Justice Black. He is classified as an
"activist"-one whose concern is justice and who does not readily
permit technicalities to frustrate the ultimate. The Court is strong,
righting wrongs wherever found; its function, where necessary and
within attainable bounds, is to impose justice on the community.
Judicial legislation is the heart of the judicial process, and a judge's
ideals guide his creative impulses. Other activists include Marshall,
Field, Peckham, Fuller and Sutherland.
Placing Black and Sutherland in the same category is heresy, of
course, and is enough to give defenders of each a stroke. But Professor Mendelson is not dealing here with attitudes toward property
or civil liberties; rather he is concerned with approaches, methods
and goals. The activist desires a strong court and believes that the
court's basic assignment is, where necessary and practicable, to impose justice (or the ideals of the Justices) upon the government and
the community. "What is justice ?" the author asks. "Not so long
ago, activists among the 'nine old men' found it in a modified ...
'laissez faire' called rugged individualism. Modern activists see it
as a humane and virile libertarianism." 8 Sutherland gave a preferred place to certain economic interests and rights while Black
grants preference to the underdog.
This, in brief, is the book's presentation of Justices Black and
Frankfurter. Whatever the author's personal views may be, Justice
Frankfurter gets the better of the matter, for the volume makes it
pretty plain that the activists approach is risky; that it eases toward
a government by men-ethical and kindly today; perhaps tyrannical
or aristocratic tomorrow. This thesis, of course, is worthy of consideration, and we should evaluate it carefully, for there are broad
'Id. at 124.
'Id.
at 117.
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implications. One may ask, however, whether it totters due to oversimplification. Black is a friend of the underdog, but is this too easy
an explanation? He is interested in social justice and freedom (so
is Frankfurter), but he is also interested in property rights of the
people; thus, there are important economic aspects, in Black's
decisions.
Over-all, the author presents his analysis and thought in a
scholarly manner, and both Justices come out of the book very well.
To be sure, few minds will be changed, but perhaps some will see,
as the volume quotes Lincoln as saying, that two men may honestly
differ about a question and both be right. For the uncommitted,
the work offers an interesting and perceptive view of two top minds
on the Court, two superb fighters. And an occasional zealot just
might perceive, in reading the volume, that the other Justice is not
in fact altogether stupid.
This suggests a final point, namely, that it may be faulty scholarship to reach firm conclusions as to a judge's personal interest in
property and procedure versus people, as derived from a study of
his decisions-a precept which constitutes an additional dimension
of this volume. I am not at all sure that Holmes was any more
against child labor than were other members of the Court; I am not
at all convinced that Sutherland was opposed to poor people; I am
far from believing that Black exceeds Frankfurter (or vice versa)
in his beliefs in freedom or that either of them would be the same if
they had sat a generation earlier. The differences in our Justices,
assuming intellectual gift, are generally less fundamental and deal
with procedure, degree or balance, and with division of powermatters less basic but nevertheless important. Freedom is to be
cherished. But balance must play a part. Liberty without bread (or
without order) is meaningless. The new countries of the world are
demonstrating this, and in some instances they are placing emphasis
on economic considerations to the detriment of freedom for the
individual. Labor unions in this country stress the group decision,
not individual dissents; and their thrust has generally been economic.
It is a mistake to say that Black is not aware of all this or that Frankfurter is alone in recognizing it. Their differences, essentially, are
as to procedure, degree or balance, and division of power. Autocrats
and aristocrats alike are uncomfortable in the presence of either.
Judging the two Justices and choosing between them on this basis
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is not only more realistic, but is more fruitful for our own lives and
thinking.
THOMAS W. CHRISTOPHER
PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

Modern Scientific Evidence. By James R. Richardson. Cincinnati:
The W. H. Anderson Company, 1961. Pp. xvi, 538. $20.00.
The application of the techniques of modern science to the adjudication of human disputes has provoked changes in the administration
of justice in the past, but the vision of what may happen in the future
as present scientific procedures are perfected and new ones are discovered is thrilling to those interested in legal development. This
revolution is not entirely peaceful, however, and some of the problems are most exasperating. Scientists are disturbed because of what
they regard as extreme conservatism of the legal profession when
presented with better methods of fact-finding. Lawyers and judges
are reluctant to give the sharp tools of science the place they deserve
in the courtroom if it means abandoning the constitutionally protected jury trial and major revision of the ancient adversary system.
There is no question but that this subject calls for investigation, and
many writers and publishers have heeded the summons. The subject
of this review is a book of this type.
The author has obviously devoted much time and effort to the
production of this book. It reflects a huge amount of research in
primary and secondary sources. As stated by the author in the
preface, the chapters fall into two parts. The first deals with general
theoretical problems associated with scientific evidence. The second
covers specific types of scientific evidence such as the polygraph,
blood grouping tests, intoxication tests, electronic speed detection
devices and others. It is also stated that the book has been written
"primarily for the practicing attorney in both the civil and criminal
law fields."
There seems to be an opinion in some quarters that a practice
book or a book for practitioners need not meet the exacting standards
observed for other law books. This reviewer does not share that
opinion. There are many technical errors in this book that careful
proofing and printing should have eliminated. They are not of great
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significance in themselves, but they divert attention and are irritating
to a profession that is trained to be alert to such mistakes.
The author also has a writing style that does not contribute to
facile communication. There are many long, abstruse sentences,
some samples appearing below.1" These are not easy reading, even
in context. In addition, some statements do not seem to communicate anything, such as, "it follows that when the law and psychiatry
get together on concepts of insanity the sharp distinction between
legal and medical insanity will be gone." 2 It is also true that when
you put your hand in water, it will be wet. Such observations fill
pages but contribute little to understanding.
More serious are errors such as the statement that Alger Hiss
was prosecuted "for alleged subversive activities. ' 3 (Hiss was indicted and convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1621, which is a perjury statute.) Now this is an entirely human mistake because Hiss
was prosecuted for perjury allegedly committed before a federal
grand jury investigating his testimony in a congressional investigation of subversion.4 When students make this mistake law teachers
'"Thus, it is clear that where a scientific advancement has been made in
a specialized field to the degree where, with substantial accuracy, under
proper circumstances, certain factual data may be affirmatively established,
or certain reasons may be excluded as the producing cause of a resultant condition, and the fact of particular scientific advancement has been accorded
legislative sanction as a proper evidential aid to the courts, but does not admit
of that degree of infallibility or preciseness as to be a conclusive determination thereof, such evidential aid should be employed with the utmost caution,
and only to the extent sanctioned by the legislature which endorsed- its use."
RIcHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 138 (1961).
"It was indicated in the previous section that the protection against selfincrimination is not universally limited to judicial or official hearings, investigations or inquiries where persons are called upon formally to give testimony, since the doctrine of self-incrimination is a logical alternative to the
rule against coerced confessions, if the real characteristic of the privilege is
protection from being compelled, under any circumstances, to give answers,
or furnish documents, which present the likelihood of conviction for crime
based on the evidence revealed." Id. at 198.

"Certainly, as a fundamental proposition, on the question whether a given

signature is in the handwriting of a particular person, comparison with other
writings of that person known to be genuine is a rational method of investigation; and that similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed, by an expert
who has the necessary special knowledge, skill, experience or training, are
probative and more satisfactory in the instinctive search for truth than
opinion formed by the unquestioned method of comparing the signature in

issue with an exemplar of the person's handwriting, existing in the mind, and
derived from direct acquaintance, however little, with the party's handwriting,
is not
2 to be denied." Id. at 472.
3
Id. at 264.
Id. at 257
'United States v. Hiss, 185 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 948 (1951).
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patiently correct them, but it should not appear in a law book, not
even a practice book. Perhaps Alger Hiss might have been convicted of the more serious offenses of treason or subversion, but he
was not. If historians find this book in the libraries, posterity may
not be so sure. It is clear that the author does not refer to the Hiss
case for the purpose of making fine distinctions about his offense,'
but it is in making this sort of technical distinction that lawyers
profess expertise. The readers of "practice books" do not expect to
be misinformed, even about collateral matters.
Another serious error is in a footnote which states,
[A]bout 125 years previously the court had held that the
Fourteenth Amendment had not imposed the privilege against
self-incrimination upon the states under the privileges and
immunities clause, and that they are not required to recognize the privilege as a requirement of a fair trial under the
due process clause of the same amendment.6
Since the fourteenth amendment will not be one hundred years old
until 1968, one wonders when in the future the Supreme Court will
hand down this holding so as to make the footnote speak the truth.
Seriously, it is not hard to perceive the meaning intended, particularly in view of the cases cited as authority for the statement. It is,
nevertheless, surprising to find the statement of law correct and the
chronology wrong.
There is much discussion of Wolf v. Colorado in chapter 6 in
which all of the fine distinctions dealing with the admissibility of
evidence illegally obtained are carefully made. It is ironic and no
fault of the author's that Wolf should be overruled by the Supreme
Court of the United States contemporaneously with the publication
of this book.7 Chapter 6 is partly obsolete as a result.
The best chapters in the book are those on psychiatry and the
polygraph. The author has utilized his eclectic method well in these
chapters; and there is much to be learned from them, especially by
those who do not have time to read the reports of the original studies
cited by the author. The book has a table of contents, a table of
cases, a table of authorities and an index, which should make it more
usable. There is also provision for periodic supplements.

'There was an attempt to impeach Whittaker Chambers, the principal
witness for the Government, by psychiatric testimony.
' Rici r.soN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 182.
'Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

